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LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
George Meader*
I.

USEFULNESS OF THE INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION

Increasingly, federal laws embodying far-reaching national policies
are being couched in broad and general terms. The effect of this type
of legislation is to place wide discretionary powers in administrative
officials and to throw upon the courts an immense burden of interpretation in applying general principles to specific factual situations. There
have been sensational instances of hasty passage of corrective legislation
made necessary by court decisions interpreting a poorly worded law in
a way Congress did not intend, such as the portal-to-portal1 and overtime-on-overtirne2 decisions. Meanwhile, the practicing lawyer is at a
loss to advise his clients of the effect of such legislation upon their lives
and businesses until the attitude of the administrative officials and the
courts becomes known. Even then, there is no assurance that such attitudes will remain fixed.
The administrative tribunal exercising legislative, administrative
and judicial functions in derogation of our doctrine of separation of governmental powers has evolved and flourished in the last few decades
largely because Congress has been unable to do more than to state a
broad policy in general terms and create a commission to carry it out.
This situation has developed because our national economy has
grown rapidly in size, organization and complexity while Congress has
remained static. Until Congress equips itself with a sizable and competent staff, it will not be able to write its legislation in clear and specific
terms and recall to itself the legislative power it has lost in the last few
decades.
The foregoing should not be construed to mean that quasi-legislative powers should not be vested in administrative agencies. The
question is one of degree. For example, the decision of the Federal Trade
Commission relating to the basing point pricing system in the cement
industry, recently upheld by the Supreme Court,3 involves a basic na,. Former Chief Counsel Senate War Investigating Committee; Member Michigan Bar.
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 66 S.Ct. 1187 (1946).
2 Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1186 (1948).
3 Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793 (1948).
1
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tional economic policy of an order that should be determined by the
elected representatives of the people, rather than by an appointive commission acting under a broad delegation of authority.
Congress must be strengthened if the balance of separate governmental powers is to be restored. That strengthening may best be brought
about by the development and effective use of the Congressional investigative function.
August 7, 1944, President (then Senator) Truman, in announcing
on the floor of the United States Senate his resignation as Chairman of
the· Special Committee. Investigating the National Defense Program,
said:
"In my opinion, the power of investigation is one of the most
important powers of the Congress. The manner in which that
power is exercised will largely determine the position and prestige
of the Congress in the future. An informed Congress is a wise Congress; an uninformed Congress surely will forfeit a large portion of
the respect and confidence of the people.
"The days when Webster, Clay, and Calhoun personally could
familiarize themselves with all the major matters with respect to
which they were called upon to leoislate are gone forever. No
Senator or Representative, no matter how able or diligent, can himself hope to master all the facts necessary to legislate wisely.
"The accomplishments of the Truman committee-and I am referring now to the other members of the committee and its staff,
rather than to myself-present an example of the results that can
be obtained by making a factual investigation with a good staff.
Similar accomplishments ~ be made by other special committees,
as well as the standing committees of the Congress, and I particularly urge upon the Senate that it be liberal in providing ample
funds for the prosecution of proper investigations. The cost of a
good investigation is negligible when compared with the results
which can be obtained."4
No reference to the investigative power of Congress can be found
in the Constitution, yet its existence is well established. Before our
nation was, born, the English Parliament and the colonial legislatures
exercised investigative powers.5 The power of Congress to "send for
persons and papers" is said to be a necessary adjunct to legislative power,
R:Bc. 6747 (Aug. 7, 1944).

4

90

6

Landis, "Congressional Power of Investigation,'' 40 HARv. L. REv. 153 at 159 (1946).
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since it enables Congress to inform and enlighten itself before enacting
laws.6
,
The basis for implying the existence of the investigative power of
Congress furnishes the guide to its proper exercise as well as the direction of its development into a more useful instrument of a democratic
system of government. In our modem, complex national economy, with
its intricate and multitudinous interrelationships, regulations and controls can no longer be adopted by simple, broad generalities but must be
based upon thorough knowledge of the detailed facts, the conB.icting
special interests and the general public interest. The effects of proposed
legislative action may thus be intelligently calculated, wise policies decided upon, and enactments stated in clear and unambiguous terms.
II.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES

Although the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19467 did not abolish
special Congressional investigating committees by its terms, the 80th
Congress did not create new special committees and the Senate drastically
reduced the powers of an outstanding special committee, the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (the former
Truman Committee). The Senate of the 81st Congress has allowed another special committee to expire, the Special Committee to Study the
Problems of Small Business. The theory of the Legislative Reorganization
Act was that standing legislative committees should do the investigative
work of the Congress.8 Senate committees were given the subpoena
power to that end.0 However, it is not alone the power of a committee
but the ability and energy of its chairman and its members in exercising
that power which determine the extent and vigor of Congressional investigating activity.
The history of Congressional investigations shows that, for reasons
unnecessary to discuss here, standing legislative committees have not
demonstrated great interest in conducting penetrating investigations.
The practical effect, therefore, of sti:8.ing the creation of special investigating committees is to weaken, not to strengthen and expand, the investigative function of the Congress.
a McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
60 Stat. L. 812 (1946).
s See S. REP. 1400 on S. 2177, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1-5 (May 31, 1946); S. 2177,
79th Cong., 2d sess., §126 (1946).
o 60 Stat. L. 812, c. 753, §134(a) (1946).
7
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A further limitation of the investigative function of Congress is contained in proposals now before Congress to establish procedural rules
for Congressional committees designed to prevent abuses to witnesses
and others in committee hearings and reports.
On January 5, 1949, Senator Lucas, majority leader of the Senate,
introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 210 to establish certain procedural rules for Congressional committees. This resolution is identical
with Senate Concurrent Resolution 44, introduced by Senator Lucas
on February 25, 1948.11
Companion resolutions to Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 were introduced in the House of Representatives on January 3, 1949, by Representative McCormack, majority leader of the House of Representatives,12 and on February 2, 1949, by Representative Sabath, chairman
of the Rules Committee of the House of Representatives.13
Similar resolutions and bills have been introduced by Representatives Holifield14 and Buchanan.15
For present purposes, it is sufficient to discuss the rules contained in
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, which is set forth in full in the appendix to this article.

IV.

PROCEDURAL RuLES FOR QoMMITTEES

The gist of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is to give certain "rights"
to any individual considering himself defamed by evidence presented
to Congressional committees, to give certain "rights" to witnesses, and
·to impose certain limitations upon committees, their members and employees.
Any person who believes that evidence given in a public hearing of
a committee defames him or otherwise adversely affects his reputation
may: (1) file a sworn statement for the record; (2) testify personally in
his own behalf; (3) require the committee to produce up to four wit10 S. Con. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 95 CoNG. REc. 51 (Jan. 5, 1949). See appendix,
infra, page 785, for text.
11 S. Con. Res. 44, 80th Cong., 2d sess.; 94 CoNG. REc. 1675 (Feb. 25, 1948).
12 H. Con. Res. 3, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Jan. 3, 1949).
13 H. Con. Res. 24, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Feb. 2, 1949).
14 H. Con. Res. 4, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Jan. 3, 1949); H.R. 74, 81st Cong., 1st sess.
(Jan. 3, 1949); H.R. 191, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Jan. 3, 1949).
15 H.R. 824, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (Jan. 5, 1949).
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nesses in his behalf; ( 4) examine such witnesses, either personally or by
counsel; (5) require the committee to procure the appearance of adverse
witnesses; and (6) .cross-examine adverse witnesses, personally or by
counsel, but for not more than one hour as to each such witness.
Persons granted these rights may file a petition with the committee,
whereupon it is mandatory for the committee, within IO days, to fix a
time and place for a hearing to be held within 30 days after receipt of the
petition.
Witnesses before committees, in either public or executive hearings,
are given the right to be accompanied by counsel and to have a copy of
the transcript of their testimony.
A committee is prohibited from: (I) receiving evidence not relevant
to the subject of the hearing; (2) publishing reports except after majority approval at a meeting called upon proper notice, and (3) publishing
a statement or a report alleging misconduct or containing other adverse
comment regarding any person without advance notice to such person.
Committee members and employees are prohibited from speaking or
writing about the committee for compensation.
"Committee" is defined to include a standing or select committee of
either house of Congress, joint committees and all subcommittees.
Senator Lucas, in discussing the introduction of Senate Concurrent
Resolution 44, announced on the B.oor of the Senate his support of the
proper exercise of the investigative function of Congress. He contended,
however, that the Senate War Investigating Committee's investigation
of Howard Hughes had brought that committee and the Senate into disrepute and cited a number of editorials in support of that contention.
He argued that requiring committees and their members and employees
to be fair would enhance public respect for Congressional investigations,
thus strengthening them.16
It can be conceded that the strength and value of a Congressional
committee is derived from its public acceptance and prestige and that
unfairness of Congressional investigators detracts from the reputation
of a committee and the Congress. However, it is doubtful that the provisions of Senate Concurrent Resolution ·2 will succeed in preventing
abusive action by legislators. On the other hand, the proposed rules will
seriously impair both the investigative and legislative work of Congress.
16 94 CoNG.

REc. 1672 (Feb. 25, 1948).
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COMMENT

Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 seeks to give persons claiming to
be defamed their "day in court.'' A legislative committee is not a court
and cannot effectively discharge its investigative and policy-making duties operating.as a court, with pleadings, motions, arguments and rules
of evidence. Furthermore, Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 gives persons claiming to be defamed more than a day in court. No court in which
allegedly defamatory testimony might be received would halt the trial
of the case to permit the aggrieved person to intervene and offer evidence
as to the damaging remark.
Courts retain control of their proceedings at all times. The discretion of the judge is the final authority in his court, subject only to appeal.
A legislative committee, however, under Senate Concurrent Resolution
2 would have no discretion whatever as to whether a hearing should be
held, who should be called as witnesses, the propriety of questions asked
upon examination or cross-examination, or the contents of statements to
be filed with the committee as a part of its record.
If the committee sought to exercise such discretion, it would be subject to the charge that it was not sincere in its purpose to give a fair and
complete hearing. If the committee does retain such discretion, the rules
have little meaning because a majority of a committee can now insist
upon "fairness" if they can agree on what is fair.
The fees and travel expenses of witnesses, stenographic and printing
expense, and other costs incident to holding such a hearing would be
borne by the committee out of its appropriation. In a court, litigants
must bear the costs of litigation. This acts as a deterrent t9 excessive
litigiousness.
The effect of the rules proposed in Senate Concurrent Resolution 2
will be to take the control of its proceedings away from Congress and
place it in the hands of individual citizens. Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 would provide a means for spotlight seekers to indulge their proclivities in Congressional hearings almost without limit.
The testimony or evidence considered by a person to be defamatory
might consist of an irrelevant, gratuitous remark made by a -witness before a committee, which the committee could not anticipate or prevent.
Nevertheless, under Senate Concurre~t Resolution 2, the committee
would be required to sit and hear a petitioner's statement and the statements of four witnesses called in his behalf and a cross-examination of
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the alleged defamer or defamers for hours, if not days. It is likely that
the petitioner in replying to his defamer might give testimony leading
the latter to believe he had been defamed; whereupon another petition
would be filed, requiring a further hearing by the committee. This
could continue indefinitely.
A trial of Communists in New York in which weeks were consumed examining the jury selection system in federal courts1 7 should
furnish convincing proof that there is a real likelihood that advantage
would be taken of the procedural provisions of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 as suggested above.
The time of legislators is now inadequate for intensive study of
problems of legislation. The forum of a legislative committee ought not
to become the battling ground of vituperation and attack and counterattack, converted from a policy-making agency into a court for trying
slander and libel cases. This would not enhance the dignity and prestige
of Congress and would render investigations and legislation worse-not
better.
Corrupt, unintelligent or unfaithful action against the public interest might well go unexposed because of the delaying, filibuster-like procedure of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. Any lawyer for the defense
is well aware of the advantage of delay. Major General Bennett E.
Meyers,18 Commander John D. Corrigan,1° former Congressman Andrew J. May, Henry and Murray Garsson,20 former Congressman
James M. Curley21 and the participants in the Teapot Dome scandal,
as well as many others, would have welcomed the procedural opportunities which would have been extended to them by the provisions
of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, had it been in effect when their
activities were under examination.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 is not confined to investigative committees ferreting out wrong-doing, but is equally applicable to all congressional committees and sub-committees. Suppose, for example, a
petitioner, who is not required to be a citizen, claimed before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that some testimony given at a committee
hearing had detracted from his reputation because it implied inefficiency
17 See,

e.g., N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 1949, p. 1:8.
Investigation of the National Defense Program, part 43, 80th Cong., 1st
sess. (1947).
19 Id. part 24, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (1944).
20 Id. part 35, 79th Cong., 2d sess. (1946).
21 Id. part 12, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1942).
18 Hearings,
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or bad faith on his part. Under Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, he
could compel the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to sit and hear
him, his witnesses and cross-examination of his detractors at length. An
even more interesting case would be presented if the petitioner claimed
that a member or employee of the committee had been the detractor and,
under Senate Concurrent. Resolution 2, claimed the right to cross-examine the Senator or a member of the committee staff.
Any rules, in addition to existing parliamentary rules, should be
adopted committee by committee. The Bender Sub-committee of the
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the House
of Representatives, the Ferguson Sub-committee of the Committee on
Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the Senate, both in the
80th Congress, and the Un-American Activities Committee of the House
of Representatives of the 81st Congress, have adopted rules. Such rules,
if found unworkable, can be amended by the individual committee.
Rules enacted in a statute would have to be amended by statute, subject
to Presidential veto. Rules adopted by concurrent resolution could be
changed only by action of both houses.
In any event, any rules, whether adopted by a committee or by the
entire Congress, should clearly specify that they do not give rights which
would permit a successful challenge to the validity of committee or Congressional action or would constitute a defense to proceedings for punishment of a contempt of Congress. Unless this effect is specifically precluded, the whole subpoena power of Congress is undermined. Thus,
a useful means of obtaining facts as a basis for the enactment of wise
legislation and for observing the administration of laws will be destroyed.
Section 5 of Senate Concu1Tent Resolution 2 adds nothing to present
practices regarding attendance of counsel except that it gives a witness a
right to have counsel present at a private hearing. Since section 5 allows
an attorney to do no more than observe, unless the committee permits
otherwise, the question of the value of this right naturally arises; the
presence of one more person makes the control of the confidential nature
of an executive hearing more difficult. As a general practice the TrumanMead Committee permitted counsel to be present in executive as well
as public hearings. Situations may well arise, however, where it would
be preferable not to have counsel present at executive hearings. The
decision on this matter should be left in the discretion of the committee.
Section 6 of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 adds nothing to present
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law since a witness may now refuse to answer any question not pertinent
to the inquiry.22
Section 7 of Senate Concurrent Resolution 2 gives witnesses at private hearings a right to a copy of the testimony. Members and employees
of a committee are subject to committee control for breaking secrecy, but
a witness is not. If a committee loses control of the executive character
of its actions the effect is to put an end to executive hearings, a useful
method of informing Congress on matters which, for one reason or another, are not appropriate for public release. The temptation to "leak"
confidential information to favored sections of the press is a strong one;
human curiosity about something kept secret lends a quality of news
interest to the material which its substance would not justify.
Measures should be taken by Congress to prevent "leaks" of confidential material, but furnishing a record of secret testimony to witnesses
is not one of them.
Section 8 adds nothing to present rules since all committee action
must now be by majority vote.
Section 9, requiring committees to give advance notice of adverse
comment, is unwieldy. What constitutes adverse comment is subject
to a wide difference of opinion. It is difficult enough under existing
practices to prepare and obtain agreement of committee members on a
report. The requirement of giving advance notice to an indeterminate
class of persons and allowing them a "reasonable" time to oppose the
committee's findings and conclusions would slow down and make extremely difficult the issuance of reports.
The Truman-Mead Committee made it a practice to submit, on a
confidential basis, a draft of a proposed report to government officials
and interested private individuals for comment as to the accuracy of the
facts and the soundness of committee conclusions and recommendations.
This is a salutary practice. It improves the quality of committee reports.
However, the practice should be discretionary with the committee, not
mandatory.
Section 10, prohibiting speaking and writing for compensation by
committee members and employees, raises a question of basic policy
applicable to all public officials. Payment for lectures or articles may be
an avenue for improperly influencing the decision of a public official.
Where this exists, it can be and should be punished under existing pro22 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 296-7, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929); 52 Stat. L.
942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. (Supp. 1948) § 192.
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visions of law. ,However, it is in the public interest that public affairs
should be widely discussed. To prohibit payment to all public officials
for lectures or articles might limit the amount of information available
to the public concerning national affairs. In any event, the principle
would seem equally applicable to all public officials. Such a proposal
should be carefully studied and adopted as a general provision of law,
if it is desirable, rather than being confined to legislative committee work.

VI.

CONCLUSION

It is agreed that "headline-seeking," "smear tactics" and "witch-hunting" are reprehensible activities on the part of legislators or any other
public officials. It may be more difficult to £ind agreement upon what
constitutes those activities in any given factual situation. There are existing sanctions controlling such abuses in present parliamentary rules, in
adverse press and public reaction, and ultimately in the defeat of a legislator at the polls.
Recognizing that legislators naturally seek to keep their names before
their constituents, it is the writer's opinion that the great majority of
Congressmen and Senators do not engage in unfair conduct. It seems
unwise to destroy the flexibility of operations in legislative committees
in their formulation of national policies and to impose limitations upon
the discretion and power of all legislators merely for the purpose of
restraining abuses by a few members of Congress. Senators and Congressmen are entitled to the trust and confidence implied in their election to what, in effect, is the board of directors of the largest and most
powerful institution in the w0rld. Their responsibility is great. They
ought not to be limited by inflexible, time-consuming procedures in discharging that responsibility.
A very thoughtful and judicious discussion of procedural rules for
Congressional committees was written by Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.,
United States District Judge of Massachusetts, in the March, 1948,
record of the New York City bar association.23 Judge Wyzanski opposes
the adoption of procedural rules for Congressional committees until after
further study, except that he suggests a witness should have the right (a)
to have counsel present, (b) to file a written statement before the hearing
is concluded, and ( c) to have an accurate record kept of his own
testimony.
23 Reprinted

in 94 CoNG. REc. Al592 (March 11, 1948).
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The avenue for strengthening the investigative power of Congress,
and thus strengthening Congress itself, does not lie along the path suggested by Senate Concurrent Resolution 2. Rather, progress toward improved legislation will result from the acquisition by Congress of a staff
of able employees, primarily for its committees, to study and investigate
the facts of any subject and to advise, counsel and assist committees and
individual legislators in enacting legislation. Congress needs help in
obtaining facts, not restrictions making it more difficult. When legislation comes to be based more upon studies of fact and less upon generalities, emotions and prejudices, our system of government by the people
through elected representatives will have proved itself workable in a
modem, complex society.
APPENDIX
Text of S. Con. Res. 2 (Jan. 5, 1949):

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the following
provisions of this concurrent resolution are adopted as an exercise of the rule-making power of
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively.
"SEc. 2. Any person who believes that testimony or other evidence given in a public
hearing before any committee tends to defame him or otherwise adversely affect his reputation
may file with the committee a sworn statement, concerning such testimony, which shall be
made a part of the record of such hearing.
"SEc. 3. Such a person shall in addition have the right (a) to testify personally in his
own behalf; (b) to have the committee secure the appearance of witnesses requested by him
for the purpose of testifying in his behalf, and to examine such witnesses, either personally
or by counsel, but no more than four such witnesses shall be called; and (c) to have the
committee secure the appearance of witnesses whose testimony adversely affected him, and to
cross-examine such witnesses, either personally or by counsel, but such cross-examination shall
be limited to one hour as to any one witness.
"SEc. 4. Any person who wishes to avail himself of the rights accorded by section 3
shall, within thirty days of the receipt by the committee of the testimony complained of, file
a petition with the committee requesting the fixing of a time and place for the receiving of
testimony or the conduct of cross-examination and designating the witnesses to be summoned.
Such a petition shall be accompanied by the sworn statement of the petitioner that the petition is not filed for the purpose of delaying or obstructing the work of the committee, but
because his reputation has been unjustifiably damaged or otherwise adversely affected by false
accusations or inference. The committee shall, within ten days after the receipt of such a
petition, fix a time and place for the receiving of testimony or the conduct of cross-examination,
which time shall not be later than thirty days after the receipt of the petition, and shall secure
the appearance at such time and place of the witnesses designated in the petition.
"SEc. 5. Any witness summoned at a _public or private hearing before any committee
shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel. Such counsel shall be allowed to observe
the hearing, but shall not be allowed to participate therein or to advise the witness while on
the witness stand unless the committee, in its discretion, shall otherwise determine.
"SEc. 6. In the conduct of hearings, the evidence received shall, so far as possible, be
relevant and germane to the subject of the bearing.
"S:sc. 7. If the testimony of a witness at a private or public hearing before any com-
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mittee is reported stenographically, such witness shall be entitled to a stenographic transcript
of such testimony upon payment of the cost of the transcript.

"SEc. 8. A committee shall not publish or file any report, interim or final, unless and
until a meeting of the committee has been called upon proper notice and such report has been
approved by a majority of those voting at such meeting.
"SEc. 9. No committee or employee thereof shall publish or file any statement or report
alleging misconduct by, or otherwise adversely commenting on, any person unless and until
such person has been advised of the alleged misconduct or adverse comment and has been
given a reasonable opportunity to present to the committee a sworn statement with respect
thereto as provided in section 2.
"SEc. IO. No member or employee of a committee shall, for compensation, speak, lecture, or write about the committee, its purposes, procedures, accomplishments, or reports during
the existence of the committee and while he is a member of the committee or in its employ.
"SEc. I I. As used in this concurrent resolution, the term "committee" includes a
standing or select committee of either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses,
and a duly authorized subcommittee of any of the foregoing."

